\chapter{Capital's globalization and root causes of barbary's threats}

\chapterauthor{François CHESNAIS}


Here we are in the era of the globalization of capital. In the coming years, the facts to be recorded in the \emph{Black Book of Capitalism} could be among the most terrifying in its history.
Philippe Paraire began the work in his contribution. I will come back later on the conclusions of Claude Meillassoux's last book.
 My task here is to try to define the new configuration of imperialism and the particular regime of accumulation that corresponds to it.

But first some political reminders are essential.
The freedom that both industrial and financial capital regains to deploy worldwide, as it had not been able to do since 1914, is of course due to the strength it has recovered by the very fact of the long phase of uninterrupted accumulation of the “glorious thirties” (one if not the longest in the history of capitalism).
However, capital could not have achieved its goals without the success of the "conservative revolution" of the late 1970s.
The triumph of the “market” could not have been achieved without the repeated political interventions of the political authorities of the most powerful capitalist states, relayed by the most important international capitalist organizations, the IMF and the GATT/WTO in the lead.
These interventions started long before 1989 or 1991. They begin ten years rather at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s.
This is where the most anti-working class political forces in OECD countries began the process of liberalization, deregulation and privatization. But the way has largely been prepared for them.
The anti-working class policies could never have succeeded in their enterprise if the Brejnévian counter-revolution had not previously crushed the Prague Spring and the movement of the Polish proletariat of the same period, if the leaderships of the communist parties of France and Italy in particular had not intervened from 1968 to 1978 to contain and repress the truly democratic potential,  and therefore anti-capitalist, the great social movements - workers and students - that marked the decade 1968-1978 in Europe, as well as in the United States and Latin America.

On the other hand, the current victory of capitalism is all the more complete because even among those who fight its effects, there are many people who no longer use the term.
They call it “neo-liberalism” and they have to oppose it only the hope, which I believe chimerical\footnote{See the conclusion of Ellen Meiksing Woods' important book, \emph{Democracy against Capitalism}, Cambridge University Press, 1995.}, of a return to more humane forms of capitalist society.
Some would certainly be surprised, if not shocked, to be told that by retreating from the word capitalism, they are giving their support to all those who affirm – on the strength of the overwhelming balance sheet of “real socialism” that the collapse of the USSR has finally revealed – that “the victory of democracy and the market” signals “the end of history” or the “unsurpassable horizon” of variants of political and social organization based on private ownership of the means of production.
The use of the term neo-liberalism is often associated with the idea that it would still be possible to combat the effects of globalized capitalism without attacking its foundations.
This is not the case. A historical period is over. It is not only the one where, on a world scale, there reigned the illusion of a model of society rival to capitalism, socially superior to it, “coexisting peacefully” with it, while being able to counterbalance it militarily if necessary.
It is also the one where, in Western Europe in particular, capitalism seemed to have been “domesticated”, bordered by political relations between the constraining classes and irreversible institutions, all resulting from the great struggles constituting the contained, that is to say frustrated, revolution of the end of the Second World War.
In France, the terrain of the great struggles of 1936 and 1945, there have long been particularly strong illusions about the ability of these relations and institutions to provide the basis for a continuous improvement of the situation of the working class as well as of broad layers of society.
Pierre Bourdieu, for whom I also have the greatest respect, is wrong to dismiss the question of capitalism and its overcoming and to focus on neo-liberalism.
But he is far from being the only one on the left to mourn the death of a “civilization of public service” specific to our country, extended at most to a few countries in Europe.


\section{The topicality of the notion of parasitism}


The title of Chapter VIII of \emph{Imperialism, the Supreme Stage of Capitalism}, “the parasitism and putrefaction of capitalism” has always greatly embarrassed the theoreticians of the Western communist parties.
That was true yesterday. At the time the “peaceful coexistence” with capitalism, as well as its various avatars, could hardly be based on the sole defense of the “socialist homeland”.
Even dominated by “American imperialism”, the system with which coexistence was defended had to have something, however limited, of “positive”;
that it still seems likely to offer the working class and its allied social strata some prospects for improving their material and moral conditions of existence.
The “embarrassing” nature of Lenin's analysis is obviously even more so today for what remains of these parties.
However, the historical segment corresponding to what is called “globalization”, or the “globalization of capital”, is most certainly the one where a set of tendencies analyzed by Lenin with the help of Hobson reaffirmed themselves on an even more gigantic scale than on the eve of the First World War.

For a time, in the 1950s and 1960s, industrial capital – the one that Marx specifies, in Chapter 1 of Book II of Capital, is “the only mode of existence of capital where its function consists not only in appropriation, but also in the creation of surplus value, in other words of surplus product” – seemed to dominate the advanced capitalist economies again.
The “layer of rentiers, that is to say, the people who live on the “mowing of coupons”, people whose idleness is the profession” (Lenin, chap. VIII) seemed to have disappeared, to have only a theoretical existence.
Similarly, placed under the aegis of industrial groups (transnational corporations), imperialist domination over neo-colonial or “dependent” countries seemed to be somewhat conducive to progress, since it was accompanied by an extension of capitalist relations of production and the formation of an indigenous working class.
Imperialism did not seem to be able to define itself in a pithy way as “an immense accumulation of capital-money in a small number of countries”, namely the countries identifiable as “rentier states” (ibid.).
Production seemed to prevail over appropriation, industry over finance, profit (largely reinvested) over financial rent.
Focusing largely on the existence of the figure of the rentier, Chapter VIII of Lenin's pamphlet was among those on which it was possible to pass very quickly.

Today, from this point of view, things are even worse: there is obviously no possible alignment with a social democracy that has itself become social-liberal if lenin's analysis is not silenced, even if it means saying that it was valid in the past, but would no longer be valid today.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. At the end of the twentieth century, world society is once again placed under the rule of a capitalism dominated by rentier layers and traits, a capitalism whose greed and ferocity in exploitation are all the stronger because it is parasitic.
It is both in the sense of Lenin, that is to say organized around institutions (the financial markets) and states (the United States and the United Kingdom in the first place) whose only possible characterization is that of rentier, and in that of Marx, that is to say marked by forms of accumulation that are oriented more towards appropriation than towards the creation of surplus value.
A little later in the same chapter of Book II, Marx indeed writes something whose scope has gone virtually unnoticed until today:
“It is because the silver aspect of value is its independent and tangible form that form A ... A', whose starting point and end point are real money, expresses in the most tangible way the idea of “making money”, the main engine of capitalist production.
The process of capitalist production appears only as an inevitable intermediary, an evil necessary to make money.
This is why all nations devoted to the capitalist mode of production are periodically taken by the vertigo of wanting to make money without the intermediary of the process of production.”
Today, the big capitalist states have done more than give in to this vertigo.
By putting the “markets” in control, they have put the world economy, that of their own countries as well as that of the entire globe, in the hands of people whose vision of the world is precisely this.


\section{An accumulation corresponding to the priorities of money-capital}

In its present configuration, the movement of the world capital system is commanded above all by the reconstitution of powerful and new forms of concentration of money-capital (the
large savings and financial investment funds), as well as through the transfer to the financial markets in central countries of important income distribution functions and essential economic regulations long controlled by States.
Large industrial groups have a leading role, but they are not the ones who control the movement of accumulation as a whole.
This is ordered from the gigantic transfers of value and surplus value made to the benefit of the living silver capital of dividends and interest on loans\footnote{I would like to refer to the second structured and amplified edition of my book, \emph{La Mondialisation du Capital}[The globalization of Capital], Éditions Syros, Paris, 1997.}.
The promotion of the financial sphere to the rank of “autonomous force” on the part of people who know nothing about the “shortened” cycle of capital (A-A') as well as the analysis of the fetish character of finance, has had the function of obscuring the role played by the states themselves in the genesis of “the tyranny of markets”.
It makes it possible to veil the mechanisms through which the financial sphere, before being able to set up closed circuits of internal distribution of purely financial gains and losses, feeds on quite concrete transfers of wealth.
Capital that develops itself in the financial sphere was born - and continues to be born - in the productive sector.
The development, or “fruiting”, of most of the real resources captured by financial institutions takes the form of investments in bonds and shares, i.e. debt securities on future economic activity.

These securities, known as financial assets, have a fictitious double dimension.
They have a life of their own in secondary securities markets, where they experience processes of increases in value that are only valid as long as valuations or agreements between financial operators relating to this value persist.
Their stock market value can therefore collapse and then have little more value than "paper rags".
As the experience of the 1930s has shown, claims on future activity may, overnight, be worthless.
But as long as accumulation is not interrupted by serious crises simultaneously shaking production, trade and financial markets, or as long as major political events leading to a moratorium or even repudiation of state debts do not take place, capital belonging to the category of "loan money capital" or "financial capital" benefits from a flow of income nourished by “real” drains on primary incomes constituted in production.  of new values and wealth.
Two traits inherently characterize money-capital.
The first is the conviction, which it is imbued with, that the funds it invests in the form of assets tradable on the financial markets, that is, it invests financially, have the “natural property” of “producing returns”.
It is the one whose owners Marx once said that for its holders, assets had to produce income (dividends and interest in the first place) “with the same regularity as the pear tree produces pears” (Capital, III, Chapter XXIV).
The second trait, intimately linked to the first, is that of being the bearer of what is called in current jargon a “patrimonial approach”\footnote{See Georges Maarek, \emph{L'économie de l'enlisement : intérêt, change, emploi dans les années quatre-vingt-dix}[The stalemate economy: interest, change, employment in the nineties], Economica, Paris, 1997.} which develops in any holder of financial assets the propensity to maintain a stock of wealth rather than taking risks to increase it.
Regardless of the “speculative” operations to which it may engage, the characteristic of this capital is to be located in places and to have distinct horizons of valorization and very far from where the activities of investment, production and marketing take place (these ensuring the indispensable closure of the cycle of development of productive capital).
Distance is not simply physical; it is ideal.
Lenin rightly speaks of the rentier layer as “people quite isolated from participation in any enterprise.”
This characterization remains accurate even when the representatives of the rentier money-capital sit on “audit committees” from where they exercise their “government over the company”.
Institutions that operate in financial markets have their own representation of the world, starting with that of the economy.
They need regular income streams from their investments, safe returns at the lowest cost.
The maturity periods of the vast majority of productive investments are completely outside their horizon.
Among financial investments, public debt securities, especially those of the States with the highest financial credibility, occupy a prominent place.
The security and regularity of returns make them the choice par excellence of contemporary concentrations of financial capital whose function is to ensure permanent and stable income streams.
But the dividends received as a drain on the profits of industrial groups have become increasingly important.
It is the level and regularity of dividend flows that audit committees are tasked with relentlessly monitoring.


\section{The original features of contemporary rentier money-capital}

In contemporary times, the unprecedented economic and social power acquired by this capital is inseparable from the place taken by private pension systems (or “pensions”)\footnote{See the article I published in \emph{Le Monde Diplomatique}, April 1997.}.
In the most central and financially powerful countries of the world-system of imperialism, they capture large employee savings for the benefit of the financial markets.
The category of capital defined as rentier by Marx, but also later by Keynes (the deep incompatibility of the rentier with an economy oriented towards investment and employment leads him to advocate its disappearance “by euthanasia” in the last chapter of the General Theory) has been qualitatively reinforced today by the formation and growth of these funds.
Already the payment of the pensions of tens of millions of people, corresponding to quite significant fractions of GDP, is taking place by means of common drains on the wealth created, of which the financial markets are the intermediaries.
The material existence of these pensioners depends on the health of the “markets”.
For fifteen years now, the payment of pensions has been based in particular on the system of positive real interest rates.
However, these are the direct cause of the snowball growth of public debt, which is the spearhead of the destruction of public social protection systems and the dislocation of the economic capacity of States.
The second component of pension and investment fund resources are dividends deducted from profits.
Taken hostage by finance capital, former employees have therefore also become a social layer that is for the moment “"objectively interested” in ensuring that the rate of exploitation of employees at work is as high as possible.
Lenin would say that rentier money-capital undertook and perhaps partially succeeded in attracting part of the working-class aristocracy to its side.
In some countries, employee representatives on the supervisory boards of the pension systems of large groups or corporations have begun to be concerned about how their savings serve as an economic, political and social firepower for the benefit of the financial markets. But their concern rarely extends beyond the borders of their own country.
It is rare to see them question the function of so-called “emerging” markets, that is to say countries or political territories that have a financial center where foreign capital can come to lay the foundations for resource flows to imperialist metropolises.

The ecumenical propensities of the “plural left” in all its components are giving rise to a certain leniency towards funded pension systems.
Is it not the system of some of the “neighbors and partners of France” that would require our respect? This leniency is not appropriate.
Employee savings investment funds are associated with deeply pernicious wealth transfer mechanisms.
They are an integral part of the whole process leading to a low level of investment, the accelerated deterioration of labour market conditions and the wage ratio, as well as the global consolidation of rentier-type subordination relations between States.

The articles of the most prestigious financial press of the Anglo-Saxon countries have the great interest of being of an absolute frankness on all these issues.
This is the case with the Financial Times, from which I will quote a lengthy editorial of 6 March 1998. Under the title “Dr. Pangloss's Perspective on Globalization,” this editorial questions the long-term viability of a system under the command of money-capital.
It expresses its concern that there are “in the West financial investors who are high in the idea that they would be the risk-takers of last resort and that they would thus have a right of divine origin to the spoils in dividends of the results of companies of companies in the industrial sector”.
Speaking of the mechanisms by rentier states to capture global resource flows, the editorial is also concerned that the Asian economic and financial crisis is not seen as a warning:
“Dr. Pangloss was an early proponent of globalization, with his claim that everything was going well in the best of all worlds.
Yet the essence of Voltaire's tale, Candide, relates to the permanent violation of human and property rights.
It is possible, of course, that Western pensions will be paid on the basis of the labor of the Chinese masses.
But for now, all is certainly not well in the world of global capital. And the political risks of globalization are being speciously minimized.”


\section{Industrial capital in a context of rentier-dominated accumulation}

Industrial groups have been the main beneficiaries of the liberalization of investment and trade so vaunted by the champions of globalized capitalism.
They have used it to pose to their employees both the threat and the effective implementation of relocation of production to countries where labour is cheap and employees have little or no protection.
They use trade liberalization both to establish supply and subcontracting networks where costs are lowest and to compete unevenly with lower-productivity firms in countries whose markets are being forced to open.
But the strength acquired by finance has also marked, ever more strongly, the strategies of industrial capital.
Since the transition from free competition capitalism to monopoly capitalism a century ago, the industrial group is without exception “a predominantly industrial financial group”.
The German scenario that serves as an example to Hilferding and Lenin, in which bank capital establishes its dominion over industrial capital, has never been the only form of this interpenetration. 
In the United States, the Carnegies and Rockefellers pioneered organizational forms in which the “industrialist”, to keep his autonomy against the “banker”, formed himself as a group (the “corporation”) and became as much financial as industrial.

The resurgence of concentrated money-capital and its taking over of the levers of control of the world capitalist system have been accompanied by two developments that make Lenin's work both relevant and calling for a double actualization in terms of the forms of interpenetration that give rise to “finance capital.” 
The first is the accentuation of the process referred to as the “increasing financialization of industrial groups”.
The expression does not have a strong conceptual value. Above all, it is a convenient way of expressing the fact that, in the context of financial globalization, the industrial group has considerably accentuated its traits as a financial group, if only because it has been subjected to both the imperative and the opportunities to make “pure” financial investments. 
Whenever they can, industrial groups struggle to decide for themselves the strictly financial, and often downright speculative, employment of a fraction of the “uninvested profit”.
In a context of slow growth and industrial overaccumulation, they will have to focus on short-term investment operations. 
We learn that Renault's return to “profitability” has been based on two pillars: 
mass layoffs, flexibility and “wage discipline”, and large financial profits due to the “good health of the markets”. 
The other major mechanism of new interpenetration is the entry of financial investment funds into the capital and management of groups. 
They provide purely financial profitability criteria that further aggravate the exploitation of employees, but which also undermine long-term investment.

It is not only in the process of financialization that the rentier traits of accumulation under financial domination manifest themselves in industrial groups. 
Many other mechanisms are working in the same direction and their strength has also increased as a result of financial liberalization and globalization. 
Mergers and acquisitions are typical of a deflationary economy, of which they are the consequence at the same time as an aggravating factor. 
They have the property that they do not aim at the extension of production by means of the creation of new capacities, but only at their restructuring with downsizing, as well as at the transfer to the acquiring group of the market shares of the merged groups or firms (this is one of the main objectives of the operations). 
We are thus witnessing an increase in the profitability of capital, sometimes significant, in the context of economies that are nevertheless experiencing low or very low growth. But the effects don't stop there. 
As a result of the increased concentration and centralization of capital resulting from these mergers, there has been a general and almost continuous increase in the “degree of monopoly”. This in turn is at the origin of a considerable increase in the “gross business result” of the groups, of the element “appropriation of fractions of value produced by smaller firms or weaker in their negotiating capacity”. 
The emergence of the so-called “network firms” has gone hand in hand with a profound process of “blurring” the boundaries between “profit” and “rent” in the formation of the operating profit of groups, as well as the growing weight of operations that fall under the appropriation of values already created by means of drains on productive activity and the surplus of other enterprises.
The “paradoxical” growth of profits and self-financing capacities of industrial groups, in the midst of the quasi-stagnation of economies, is therefore also based on these mechanisms of capturing the emerging value of monopsony power in addition to those relating to the aggravation of the exploitation of labor by each industrial group taken separately.

But it is based even more centrally on changes in the relationship between capital and labour or wage relations, a key aspect of globalisation born of liberalisation and deregulation\footnote{See Thomas Couterot's book, \emph{L'entreprise néo-libérale, nouvelle utopie capitaliste ?}[The neoliberal enterprise, new capitalist utopia?], Éditions La Découverte, Paris, 1998.}. 
At rates and under conditions that have varied widely across OECD countries — as not all countries have implemented policies to liberalize and deregulate wages and employment conditions as quickly and sharply as the United States and the United Kingdom — industrial groups have taken advantage of rising unemployment and the reconstitution of the “industrial reserve army” to weigh on wages and hiring conditions, as well as exploiting new technologies to impose new labour standards in workshops and offices.  
They were able to do so all the more easily as liberalization led to a form of constitution of the industrial reserve army as a “world army”. 
Relocations, both in the form of direct investment and international subcontracting, allow industrial groups to draw on the world's reserves of diversely skilled workers, without having to emigrate them to metropolitan areas, but also using them to begin the process of internationally aligning wages with the lowest levels, with a given qualification.


\section{Countries under imperialist domination within a shrinking system}


On the basis of mainly political criteria, Lenin characterized imperialism as “reaction on the whole line.”
He noted the presence of stagnation trends engendered by monopoly positions.
But at the time of writing he did not yet detect the dominance of tendencies in the direction of the contraction of the capitalist system.
Trotsky will be the first to identify behind the crisis of the 1930s, the existence of such tendencies.
But the theory of “neo-capitalism”, of which the Italian Communist Party was the main laboratory, was later opposed to it.
During the long expansion phase of 1950-1974, capitalism seemed to have returned to expanded reproduction.
This ended with the recession of 1974-1975, which effectively saw the opening of what has been called “the crisis”, a term not precise enough, but not totally inappropriate either.

Today we are living in contradictory times. On the one hand, capitalism seems to triumph.
In the context of globalization, it is completing the subordination of the regions and activities that had eluded it.
But it is actually doing so in the context of a continuous slowdown over the long period of investment and growth;
in the context of a situation marked by the presence of indicators reflecting the trend contraction of accumulation rather than its enlargement.
Inspired by the classic distinction of the “Unpublished Chapter of Capital”, we can say that the subordination it imposes is a matter of mechanisms that recall formal submission rather than real submission.
The mechanisms of “siphoning” value trump creation. The choice of indicators to assess a trend is obviously not neutral.
It refers to theoretical and political postulates\footnote{See Chapters 1 and 12 of \emph{The Globalization of Capital}, op. cit.}.
If we take the indicator of growth of world product per capita, which is a serious indicator of the state of wealth production before the conditions of its distribution intervened, we see that this annual growth rate was around 4\% between i960 and 1973, then fell to 2.4\% between 1973 and 1980, it is only 1.2\% between 1980 and 1993.
Another indicator that many economists consider crucial is the level of private investment.
However, in the OECD countries, i.e. the richest, the investment curve as well as the savings curve are tilted sharply downwards so that we are at the limit of a situation of enlarged reproduction.
In 1994, the World Trade Organization (the already notorious WTO) published a long statistical series that shows the steady fall, beyond cyclical fluctuations, in the average annual rate of world growth. Over the period 1984-1994, this rate fell to 2 per cent and could be even lower at the turn of the millennium.
The permanent creeping overproduction that turns into open overproduction with each crisis, as is the case today for Korea, Japan and soon Taiwan and China\footnote{See my article in \emph{Carré Rouge}, n° 7, March 1997 (P.O. Box 125, 75463, Paris Cedex 10).}, is only one of the most conspicuous manifestations of a regime of accumulation, in which the capitalist system as a whole does not produce enough value, even if it has returned to the exploitation of children on a vast scale,  if, everywhere, it constantly increases the degree of exploitation of the workers it employs.
Let me insist. The total mass of value created is not based solely on the rate of surplus value, but also on the volume of capital set in motion in production. However, it is declining tendentially.

It is in the context of this tendential contraction of the capitalist system in its centre that we must examine the fate of the countries on the periphery.
The only countries interested in money capital are those with a financial centre sufficiently developed to aspire to the status of “emerging financial market”.
Outside the OECD countries, there are less than twenty. And this interest is that of setting up mechanisms for siphoning resources to the central countries.
For their part, the industrial groups of the imperialist countries are only very selectively interested in external countries. They do so in three ways.
The first is as markets, under conditions where exports made by large industrial groups through their marketing subsidiaries have once again become the preferred option, direct investment in the strict sense being only a second-tier solution used in specific circumstances only.
Production subsidiaries continue to be created when this form of direct market presence is necessary due to the size of the market and the regional strategic importance of the country (China and Brazil);
due to the long-standing presence of global rivals whose strategies must be countered locally; or the existence of local opportunities that cannot be exploited without direct investment.
But otherwise, the productivity levels and industrial capacity reserves of the central capitalist countries push groups to prefer exports as a means of taking advantage of a market.
Countries outside the Triad are also required as a source of raw materials. But only as long as they are not threatened by substitute products.
Their third function is to serve in basic labour-intensive industries for off-site subcontracting operations requiring industrial labour that is both skilled (or even highly skilled), highly disciplined and very cheap.
But here again, the number of countries that satisfies these conditions is all the more limited as the needs of capital are limited by the general weakness of accumulation.

It is in this context that the rise of hunger, pandemics and internal wars in many parts of the world is taking place. 
Black Africa, whose system rejects a large part of the agricultural raw materials produced within the plantation economy previously set up at the expense of food production, and whose workforce does not meet the many “qualities” of that of Southeast Asian countries is in this case. 
What has been happening there for fifteen years is no coincidence. This is the direct result, mediated by the political corruption peculiar to the rump states of neo-colonialism, of the marginalization of the majority of the continent's countries in world trade. 
The “contingent” translates the “necessity” of rotting capitalism. The UN has just recognized the Rwandan genocide as the third genocide of this century, after that of the Armenians and after the Holocaust. 
But if the former can still be analyzed without recourse to the theory of imperialism, the Holocaust cannot be. 
Even in a different way, the same is true for the Ruandan genocide. At the end of a meticulous work on Africa, Claude Meillassoux concludes that the law of the population of Malthus is reactivated by capitalism: 
“The control of the demography of exploited peoples, by demographic means (birth control, sterilization, etc.) has failed. 
A form of control through hunger, disease and death, more effective and cruel, is established under the pretext of “economic rationality” and “structural adjustment”: 
the lesson of Malthus has been heard”\footnote{Claude Meillassoux, \emph{L'économie de la vie}[The economy of life], Cahiers Libres, Éditions Page 2, Lausanne, 1997.}.

I will be told that these are typically “leftist” exaggerations. Maybe. 
But let no one come and tell us later “that he was not informed”, that he had “not understood”. This time the massive death chambers of capital are public and are shown in the reports, just as it is in full view of the whole world that the Gulag is perpetuated in China. 
But there are still few people who are ready to associate these facts with a serious characterization of this capitalism to which we are urgently invited to “adapt” since socialism would be at best a utopia, at worst the announcement of a new totalitarianism.


\section{To conclude}


It is more necessary than ever to continue to update the black book of capitalism, begun since the Americas fell under the double control of merchant capitalism and the Church.
But this task cannot absolve us of responding to the formidable problems posed by the bankruptcy of “real socialism” and the extent of the rubble left after almost seventy years of undivided Stalinist domination over the country where the October Revolution took place.
It also implies shedding light on the current configuration of rotting capitalism.
Few people have yet come to contradict the apologists of the “new world order” under American domination since they declared, after the collapse of the USSR, that “the victory of democracy and the market” signaled “the end of history” or the “unsurpassable horizo” of private ownership of the means of production.

Class struggle has indisputably already begun to give them a formal denial in many countries, but this denial of “praxis” will only be complete if it advances head-on with immense theoretical work.
This work presupposes that the work of the working class and the oppressed draw the balance sheet of the rise of Stalinism and its victory, as well as the lies, crimes and slanders carried out in its name outside the USSR and in France in particular.
But it also requires to be nourished by analyses that do not erase the putrefaction of capitalism and that explain how a period is closed:
one where capitalism had anything to offer humanity. This is the meaning of my participation in this welcome collection.



\rauthor{François Chesnais}



François Chesnais is an economist, author of numerous books including La Mondialisation du Capital, Éditions Syros, Paris, 1997.

