@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ It remains to measure its past and present role, no longer on the French scale b
\section{Emerging capitalisme and colonial conquest}
1. The share of capital in the decision of the expedition of Algiers.
\subsection{The share of capital in the decision of the expedition of Algiers.}
Paradoxically, the Algiers expedition, which occurred in France at the end of the transition from mercantilism to the Industrial Revolution, was made against the proponents of economic liberalism and the representatives of manufacturing.
They are opposed to public spending where they see little prospect of profit.
@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ The same is true of a Bignon, deputy of the Eure (and the textiles of Évreux),
Both tendencies persisted after 1830: liberalism, advocating the use of capital spent in Algeria to equip France, and “a small number of monopolists” speculating on land “bought fictitiously and at a low price (to re-)sell it much more expensive”.
These monopolists were denounced on May 20, 1835 by Desjobert, deputy of Seine-Maritime, also a draper department \footnote{\emph{Ibid., vol. 96,} in R. VALET, \emph{op. cit.}}.
In his eyes, the motivations of the monopolists remain interested \footnote{\emph{Ibid.}}: “the only result” of the conquest remains in 1835 “to have transported to Marseille the business (...) previously spread throughout France. ”
In 1839, however, he could not “grant (the war) a man, nor a penny.”
The Count of Sade, recalling in 1835 that “the lands are not available” \footnote{\emph{Ibid., vol. 96,} in R. VALET, \emph{op. cit}} refuses to “exterminate the natives before dispossessing them”.
@ -51,10 +50,7 @@ The dominant tendency of rising capitalism was, from the beginning, to assume th
The latter proposes, after having noted “the contradiction (of) the march of the occupation” “to extend colonization under military protection” so as not to reduce “the fruit of many efforts” \footnote{Minutes and reports of the commission appointed by the King on 7 July 1833.}.
The capture of Constantine in 1837 rallied, apart from Desjobert's last fires, the liberals to a “single thought” of French capitalism.
2. War on the people, a deliberate policy. 1830-1871.
\subsection{War on the people, a deliberate policy. 1830-1871.}
As an instrument of conquest, war had, from the beginning, led to atrocities.
The African Commission was aware of it, which, before deciding to continue it, reported:
@ -65,12 +61,9 @@ We have massacred people with safe-conduct; slaughtered, on suspicion, entire po
The “contempt for a solemn capitulation” (...) of rights ... the most natural of the peoples”, recognized as such by the very decision which violated them, marked in 1833 the will to continue this war to extend the occupation of the country.
Following its example, Voirol, as early as 1834 in Algiers, then Trézel in 1835 in Orania, violated the Desmichels Treaty, concluded on January 6, 1834 with 'Abd el-Qader, to have a free hand against the bey of Constantine.
Similarly, once this city was taken, the deliberate transgression in 1839 of the Treaty of Tafna concluded for the same end, with the same partner, on May 30, 1837, the deliberate passage of troops in the disputed area because of the ambiguity between Arabic text and French translation, provoked the offensive reaction of the emir.
In the House on 8 June 1838, had Not Bugeaud said: “Treaties have never bound nations except when they are in accordance with their interests? \footnote{Cité par AZAN (Colonel P.) \emph{L’Émir ‘Abd-El-Kader}, Paris, 1925..”}
2.1. Massacres.
\subsubsection{Massacres.}
In 1833, massacres had already taken place: thus, in 1832, that of the tribe of el-Oufia, in Mitidja, reported in his memoirs by an officer \footnote{CHRISTIA, \emph{L’Afrique française}, Paris, 1863.}:
“A corps of troops surprised... the sleeping tribe... and slaughtered the unfortunate... without a single one seeking to defend himself (...); no distinction was made, neither of age nor of sex.
@ -96,9 +89,7 @@ Babor and the Wadi el-Kebir in 1851 \footnote{\emph{Ibid.} (1846-49), p. 11, (18
in Nara, “everything that had been locked there passed through weapons or crushed by the fall of the terraces of houses” \footnote{\emph{Ibid.} (1846-49), p. 11.}.
In 1857, during the occupation of the great Kabylia, according to the Count of Hérisson \footnote{HÉRISSON (Count of), \emph{La chasse à l’homme}, Paris, 1866.}, “the native ears were worth for a long time 10 francs a pair, and their wives remained, like them, a perfect game” as well as in the South where, from a column where a shot had not been fired, he confessed to having brought back “a full barrel”.
2.2. Looting and destruction.
\subsubsection{Looting and destruction.}
The looting had begun as soon as Algiers was taken, with the sack of the “Treasury of the Qaçba” estimated at “30 million strong piastres” (more than a billion and a half today) and “reduced by two-thirds, and all the precious stones” \footnote{BARTILLAT (Marquess of), \emph{Relation de la campagne d'Afrique en 1830}(Relation of Africa campaign in 1830), Paris, 1833.} in violation of the capitulation agreement and in defiance of the claims of the dey.
After the stranglehold on the 51.7 million gold francs inventoried in the Algerian treasury (more than 600 million today), they continued to swell, “formalizing”, confusing themselves with the collection of taxes, penalties, fines, war contributions, or sequestration. They thus contributed to the economic decline of the country.
@ -160,11 +151,7 @@ All thoses destructions was accompanied by the flight of the inhabitants:
of all those, Muslims and Jews, of Miliana; of all those also of Medea, Mascara, Cherchel, Tenès; 7,000 of the 10,000 Oranese, more than a third of the 35,000 Constantinois, the 12,000 Tlemcenians, the 30,000 to 40,000 Algiers.
The result, note the T.E.F. about Constantine, “an unfortunate influence on the industrial and commercial movement of the city” \footnote{T.E.F. (1840), pp. 364-65.}, also reported for Algiers, Mascara, Tlemcen, etc. (increase in prices and rents, impoverishment and scarcity of buyers, break with the countryside, etc.), in no way compensated by the “traffic” initiated around the garrisons of the new centers.
2.3. The looting of property and land.
\subsubsection{The looting of property and land.}
The looting of property and land is, from the outset, the intended outcome of these abuses.
“Wherever there is good water and fertile land,” Bugeaud said, “this is where settlers must be placed without knowing who owns the land (... and ...) distribute them to them in full ownership” \footnote{Speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 14 May 1840.}.
@ -188,9 +175,7 @@ This dispossession benefits, from this phase, the concentration of land capital,
It has destructured and impoverished rural society, putting it at the mercy of imposed “purchases” in the future, even though even before the sequestration of 1871, more than 500,000 hectares were taken from it by colonization, 96\% by the colonial state.
It has also nationalized or communalized areas of the same order.
2.4. Consequences : The algerian “demographic disaster”.
\subsubsection{Consequences: The algerian \enquote{demographic disaster}.}
The whole period of colonial possession is indeed for the country, as Dj. Sari pointed out about the famine of 1867-1868, a “demographic disaster” \footnote{SARI (Djilali), \emph{Le désastre démographique}(the demographic disaster), Algiers, 1982.}.
This was compounded by the loss of life in combat, during the massacres, the destruction, looting and taking committed on a piecemeal basis, as well as the dispossession and living conditions imposed on all Algerians by the system.
@ -239,9 +224,7 @@ sometimes (in Tlemcen) appeared in 1865, return accentuated in 1867 and especial
In Miliana, if the balance sheet is, narrowly, negative for the Europeans (but not for the Jews), in 1867 and 1868 it is much more so for the Muslims of the commune, except in 1865 and 1870, with, in 1867 and 1868, 485 deaths then 354 deaths per 3,000 inhabitants (16.2 then 11.8\%!) and a growth deficit of 379 then 281 individuals.
The mark of a rural excess mortality at least as serious can be read in the inscription (usually insignificant) of 107 and then 486 unknown and external to the commune who came to take refuge and die there, these two years.
2.5. The consequences: the impoverished and bruised French people.
\subsubsection{The consequences: the impoverished and bruised French people.}
If the colonial conquest entails, for Algeria, the integration into structures of colonial exploitation in the subjection to a minority of newcomers supposed to represent France, this mutation is not for all that to the advantage of the French people.
@ -252,6 +235,7 @@ The metropolitan contribution intended to fill it, equal to 45\% of local resour
In 1863 it accounted for 11\% (2,316,000 gold francs) of the forecasts of civil expenditure alone— a quarter of total expenditure — unproductive expenditure devoted solely to administration.
However, these expenses represented little cost compared to military expenses, entirely covered by the French budget of the war:
in 1839, the appropriations of the military health service and engineering alone (6,893,038 gold francs) equalled 80\% of the total civilian budget, and in 1863, the year of respite from the fighting, as the previous one, the total forecast of army expenditure reached 62,067,553 gold francs (nearly one billion today).
The profits went to colonial enterprises, primarily financial and commercial, without enriching or equipping Algeria other than to install colonization and drain its production.
The installation of a system of exchange of raw products of colonization, then agricultural for more than 40\% of their value, — cereals exported even in 1867, against the import of very little flour! \footnote{Cf. SARI (Dj.), \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 188-191 and pp. 208-209.} - against elaborate imports, created, at the same time as these profits, a permanent deficit, of the order of 40 to 50 million fr.-or (between 20 and 50 \% of exports) by increasing exports from less than 10 million in 1850 to 108 in 1864 and 165 in 1872 and imports from 50 to 130 and then 206 million \footnote{PRENANT (A.), La dépendance de l'Algerie et les finances françaises, In Économie et Politique(economy and politics), Nov. 1956, pp. 42-51.}.
It was also this deficit that was offset by the contribution of public funds.
@ -259,21 +243,20 @@ It was also this deficit that was offset by the contribution of public funds.
The human losses, especially affecting the working class who were unable to pay the replacements they provided in the era of seven-year military service, exceeded 200,000 deaths during these forty years.
The war retained at least until 1871 more than 70,000 metropolitan soldiers each year (73,188 out of 80,862 to the total number in 1844, 70,611 out of 83,870 in 1859, relatively calm years) and many more during offensives and uprisings (in 1835-1836, 1840-1842, 1845-1846) where they were well over 100,000, one for every 30 Algerians, including women and children.
It was the same in 1857, 1863-1865, and even in 1871, before the uprising, when the German army invaded France.
Of these numbers, deaths in ambulances and hospitals, 125,000, or more than 3,000 per year (4\%), are approaching, in a population of young adults physically “fit”, twice the average rate of civilian deaths at the time.
For a rate of 1\% of the workforce in the quiet years (thus in 1861-1863), or 2\% (in 1852-1853), we reach 4\% in 1847, 5\% in 1838, 10\% in 1832-1833 or in 1836-1837, 14\% (9,587) and 12\% (7,802) in 1840 and 1841, at the beginning of the war against 'Abd el-Qader, and as much in 1851 and 1857 during the Kabylie campaigns, in 1859 and 1871.
This means that more than 100,000 of these dead were direct victims of the war.
The number of killed in battle, when it is mentioned (254 at the Macta in 1835, “hundreds” at the Tafna in 1836, more than 1,000 in 1837 during the two assaults against Constantine, 108 in Mitidja on November 21, 1839, 332 at the Mouzaïa pass on May 12 and June 15, 1840, 400 at Sidi Brahim in 1845, the entire Beauprêtre column in 1864) was often superior, rarely less than half that of the wounded.
It exceeds even more the number of those who died of their injuries in hospital. This allows for a total loss approach.
Finally, among the generals of the army of Algeria are Cavaignac, who, having returned to France, directed the murderous repression of the days of June 1848, and Saint-Arnaud, organizer of December 2, 1851 and the repression that followed.
\section{The exploitation of “French Algeria” (1871-1954)}
\section{The exploitation of \enquote{French Algeria} (1871-1954)}
The suppression of the insurrection of 1871 created for 75 years, then, after an even more deadly repression, in 1945, for another ten years, until November 1954, a period of “calm” favorable to “business”.
1. The “calm” of exhaustion.
\subsection{The \enquote{calm} of exhaustion.}
It is in reality the cessation of military resistance, which is now disturbed only by sporadic movements.
It was achieved by the physical destruction of a significant part of the population, especially male, the economic ruin of its great majority, its social destructuring and its cultural disintegration, at the end of the forty years of previous war.
@ -285,9 +268,7 @@ It is that, even if the colonial power resumes, from 1880, on the southern margi
It is against this exploitation at the same time as against the political and cultural dependence that allows it that, from the First World War, the political movement is organized more and more around a national demand.
It is against this politicization that exploitation imposes from the end of the nineteenth century its discriminatory legislation, corollary of socio-economic discrimination.
2. What does “the work of France” represent?
\subsection{What does \enquote{the work of France} represent?}
Until algeria's independence, French schoolchildren heard about “the work of France”; since 1962, memories of the “exceptional infrastructure” bequeathed by the colonizer to his colonized who became independent have been revived:
roads, railways, vineyards, citrus fruits, health, schools, etc., on the understanding that Algeria would have had nothing in 1830 and that it has been “given” everything since then.
@ -321,23 +302,24 @@ In 1947, 1948, 1949 had died at less than a year 245, then 195, then 201 childre
One wonders how much of the difference between the 276,000 Muslim children declared in 1948 and the 195,000 recorded is due to this infant mortality.
Similarly, schooling affected very few Muslim school-age children, mostly male and especially urban:
in 1951-1952, 168,940 boys in primary classes and 56,796 girls— 16 per cent of schoolchildren, or 25 per cent and 8.8 per cent of each sex, compared with 10 per cent in 1940.
in 1951-1952, 168,940 boys in primary classes and 56,796 girls— 16\% of schoolchildren, or 25\% and 8.8\% of each sex, compared with 10\% in 1940.
However, according to Rozet \footnote{ROZET, \emph{op. cit.}, vol. II, p.75.}, in 1830, “almost all men knew how to read, write, count” and “there were (in Algiers) a hundred schools... where children were taught to read and write the Qur'an, and sometimes a little calculation.”
All the more so, at the end of the colonial period, segregation only exceptionally allowed “Muslim” children access to kindergarten, secondary education (one for every five Europeans), and even complementary courses, where there were 5,567, including 1,625 girls, 0.6\% of their age group, compared to 10,111 colonials; At university, at the time of independence, they would be only 5\% of students.
As for the technical infrastructures, they were only commensurate with the requirements of colonization and capital. There was of course in 1830 no kilometer of rail in Algeria, — neither in France.
But the 4,372 kilometers, single-track, often narrow-gauge, set up from the 1860s, represented, for four times the surface and a fifth of the population of France only one-fifteenth of the metropolitan railways, based on the colonial minority alone and a tenth of the colonized, in equivalent numbers.
They responded, in their traffic as in their route, only to the need to drain export products to the ports, by linking Morocco and Tunisia by Oran, Algiers, Bône (Annaba) through the colonized plains, and leading to these ports, to Nemours (Ghazaouet), Bougie (Bejaïa) and Philippeville (Skikda), zinc from Zellidja, alfa of the routes of Crampel (Ras-el-Mâ), from Bechar (Kenadza) with coal, and from Djelfa, dates from Touggourt and Biskra, phosphates and iron from Kouif and Ouenza.
All the unprofitable branches from Tlemcen to Beni-Saf, towards Arzew and Mostaganem, even the wheats from Tiaret, especially in the Eastern High Plains between Meskiana, Khenchela and Tebessa, had already been deposited.
On a network with loose meshes, traced (like the Bechar rail for strategic reasons) private road traffic replaced, with 43,078 trucks in 1951, 40\% of a car fleet whose 56,391 passenger cars corresponded to the French service rate (1 for 40 souls) only, again for the million Europeans and one Algerian in ten.
3. Gifts? Yes, not to Algeria, but to Capital.
\subsection{Gifts? Yes, not to Algeria, but to Capital.}
What remains true in the thesis of J. Marseille is the constancy of deficits, except for certain years from one world war to another.
But these are public deficits, and they do not have their origin in spending of general interest, let alone social carried out “for Algeria”.
As we have seen, the “state of equilibrium” linked to the “satisfactory situation of public finances” from 1914 to 1945 is in no way accompanied by “a relatively maintained subsistence minimum for a large majority of the population” \footnote{MARSEILLE (J.), op. cit., p. 140.} which, before 1941-1942 and 1945, experienced urban mortality rates exceeding 4\% from 1911 to 1929, 4.5\% from 1917 to 1922 and in 1927-1929 and even 5\% in 1920-1922.
These rates are linked to malnutrition and lack of care and demographic deficit factors.
This is because, as A. Nouschi notes, only “5 to 10\% of the natives (are) inserted in the commercial movement” and that, as Marseille acknowledges \footnote{\emph{Id., ibid.}, p. 72.}, the difference with the price paid to the producer matters a lot.
In fact, government spending is the result of low private investment, and the assistance provided to it to make profits.
J.Marseille writes it himself, when he shows \footnote{\emph{Id., ibid.}, p. 237.}, in 1927, the “(French) winegrowers exasperated by wine imports from Algeria (subject) to infinitely lower tax charges”, subsidized, paying the gasoline of tractors five times less, and that he recalls the absence of social insurance.
The quote he makes of Giscard d'Estaing taking up H. de Molinari in 1898, according to which “Algeria had already cost more than 4 billion (and) claims every year from 20 to 30 million from the metropolis to cover its budget” underlines the permanence of the imbalance between these public investments and the weakness of the private effort to withdraw its profits:
@ -348,6 +330,7 @@ In truth, these “good deals” were made at the expense of the Algerian people
The clearest is the transfer of land, from the Warnier law (1873) carried out more by forced transactions (for debts, mortgages etc.) than by official attributions, often for the benefit of absentee urban businessmen.
In the 1950s, this transfer left in the hands of 20,000 owners, 2,700,000 hectares, a third (the best) of the country's arable land, half to a tenth of them.
99\% of Algerian owners share the remaining two-thirds and are thus reduced either to insufficient exploitation or to daily work, possibly complementary. This is the major factor in the rural exodus.
In the years preceding the Second World War and in those that followed it, the very slowdown in production and the difficulties due to the crisis and then the war led to a decrease in French exports and, consequently, a reduction or disappearance of the Algerian balance deficit.
However, this deficit, already present and increased, as we have seen, from 28 to 90 million gold francs from 1863 to 1873, rose from 34 to 78 billion francs in current terms from 1950 to 1954, toward France, but also, increasingly, toward other countries.
@ -360,8 +343,7 @@ It was to prolong the constant tendency to “make the poor pay” since the tim
In the Algerian GDP of 1953, the share of profits was 47\% (239 billion francs current), that of wages only 34\% (160 billion), and the proportion of accumulated capital reinvested on the spot, 52\%:
the repatriation of the rest (46 billion that year) and the amount of the trade deficit represented the exodus of capital offset by public funds.
4. The massacre opposed to rising political demands.
\subsection{The massacre opposed to rising political demands.}
Exceptional legislation, maintaining segregation, has been the weapon used to impose on Algerians this situation of inequality formalizing their exploitation.
The code of indigenate, legalized in 1874, extended to the “mixed communes” of civilian territories in 1881, revised in 1881 and 1914, maintained this “apartheid” until the Second World War.
@ -386,16 +368,14 @@ Still, fraud reigns over these “Algerian-style” elections systematized by th
It is, with the continuation of the repression, and the maneuvers of division of the national movement, in particular between parties, but also within the M.T.L.D. (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms) the means sought to allow the continuation of exploitation.
This is the observation that leads to the insurrectional struggle a nucleus from the O.S. (Special Organization) from the P.P.A., which triggers, on November 1, 1954, the armed action that will lead, eight years later, to independence.
\section{1954-1962. A war to keep exploiting}
1. A return to massacres, destructions, destructuring.
\subsection{A return to massacres, destructions, destructuring.}
The number of Algerian deaths from the war of independence is uncertain.
Even if it is probably between the million and a half affirmed by the F.L.N. and the 330,000 to which the official French counts reduce it, anxious not to count the corpses of the mass graves that are discovered from time to time.
Disagreements between the results of the 1954, 1960 and 1966 counts and the natural increase balances allowed by the declarations must be read in view of the accentuation of the under-reporting of births and deaths.
This is evident for births, the rate of which from 1950 to 1955 was constantly between 4.2 and 4.4 per cent and rose to almost 5 per cent after 1962.
This is evident for births, the rate of which from 1950 to 1955 was constantly between 4.2 and 4.4\% and rose to almost 5\% after 1962.
It exists all the more so for deaths whose reported number, during these eight years, rises, above the 115,000 of 1954 as of 1963, up to 140,000 to 154,000 after 1956, i.e. an annual excess mortality of 0.4 to 0.5\% (already more than the official French figure).
The 1960 count also found 168,000 fewer inhabitants than would result from the reported natural increase, while emigration to France had become scarcer, and the 1966 census another deficit of 160,000, mainly due to the years 1960-1962, if only because of the return of refugees in 1963-1964.
We can thus consider as likely the loss of at least 600,000 Algerian human lives, not counting the French killed, due to the obstinacy of French colonial capital, especially after the discoveries of Saharan hydrocarbons, to keep Algeria.
@ -405,8 +385,7 @@ To the deaths are added, in Algeria, the destruction of villages, crops and fore
and the displacement of populations (estimated at least 1,800,000 souls) \footnote{Cf. \emph{L’Événement du Jeudi}, 25 au 31 Octobre 1990.}, driven from prohibited areas, thus removed from their cultures and "grouped" (concentrated) either in plains in areas of mechanized colonial appropriation that do not offer work, or around cities.
The rural exodus, triggered at the end of the last century by the dispossession of the fellahs, reinforced after 1918 by the loss of jobs linked to the mechanization of agriculture, is thus exacerbated, accentuating imbalance and distortion between settlement and economy of cities deprived of housing (until the colonial exodus of 1962), social infrastructure and industry.
2. Adverse impact on France.
\subsection{Adverse impact on France.}
Financial imbalance and budget deficit only increased in France, from 1954 to independence, due to the increase in military spending that had given rise to it 124 years earlier.
As early as 1955 the contribution of the metropolitan budget to that of Algeria was increased by a third — from 107 to 140 billion francs \footnote{PRENANT (A.), art. Cit. 1956, p. 43.} (about 17 billion today) — apart from the military expenses due to the sending in 1954-1955 of the “drafted”, then to that of the conscripts of the contingent and to the extension of one year of their service, allowed by the granting in March 1956 of the “special powers” to Guy Mollet.
@ -417,9 +396,7 @@ This violence, in France, is also reflected in the racist attitude of the police
they will find their climax after the arrival at the police headquarters of Maurice Papon, former prefect of Constantine, on October 17, 1961, when 200 Algerians, peaceful demonstrators, are killed, mainly by drowning in the Seine, by police commandos \footnote{See EINAUDI (J.L.), \emph{La Bataille de Paris}, 17 October 1961, Paris, Seuil, 1991.}.
This violence of the power is also exercised against the French protests, two months later, in Charonne, where nine demonstrators are killed.
3. The oil interest. The deficit worsened, the profits increased.
\subsection{The oil interest. The deficit worsened, the profits increased.}
Even before May 13, the discoveries of Algerian gas and oil (Edjeleh, Hassi Mess'aoud), initially of interest to the C.F.P., Esso-Rep and S.N. Repal had, for 40 billion then invested until 1957, brought new motivations for the continuation of the war.
An Israeli-style partition plan, already suggested under Guy Mollet, had even been prepared for de Gaulle by Alain Peyrefitte \footnote{PEYREFITTE (Alain), \emph{C’était de Gaulle.}(It was De Gaulle)vol. 1, Paris, Fayard, 1994, pp. 76-77.}, bringing together the colonial population, and oil installations fixed in Arzew, between Mitidja and the plains of Oran and Sidi bel-'Abbes, with the Saharan corridors of oil and gas pipelines, and leaving Algerians Algeria non-oil, non-wine-growing, and not citrus.
@ -443,7 +420,8 @@ It is a productive apparatus created for Algerian national needs, offering four
During the previous eighteen years, during which Algeria had hardly remained linked to international capitalism except by the exchange of 95 to 98\% of its hydrocarbons for imports, mainly of equipment (for more than a third) and (for all that) of raw materials and semi-finished products, the production of energy (and above all electricity) had been multiplied by 7.
Industrial production, especially public production, diversified, had seen its value more than tripled and satisfy for more than half its own demand, that of agriculture, construction and consumers; that of agriculture, despite the decline of the vine with the closure of its subsidized market, had remained constant, but for a population almost doubled and with increased requirements.
Oil exports (\$8 billion) accounted for only 15\% of GDP, quadrupled since independence, which represented per capita, 2.3 times that of Tunisia, 4 times that of Morocco.
The distribution of creations, planned to rebalance between regions and between rural and urban areas, employment and settlement, implied the acceptance of additional costs increased by the demand for housing and social needs: primary school enrolment increased to 75 per cent (60 per cent for girls), average enrolment to 40 per cent, secondary school to 25 per cent.
The distribution of creations, planned to rebalance between regions and between rural and urban areas, employment and settlement, implied the acceptance of additional costs increased by the demand for housing and social needs: primary school enrolment increased to 75\% (60\% for girls), average enrolment to 40\%, secondary school to 25\%.
It is by giving the classic weapon of colonial control, the debt, contracted to respond by importing to shortages born of increased demand and turn a “non-competitive” production towards a diversification of exports that Algeria has reopened itself to the domination of big capital.
But its recolonization, which is no longer the work of a State, requires its integration, in a subordinate position, into the “new world order”.
The search for an increase in the value of exports through the very expensive valorization of hydrocarbons (the “Valhyd” plan) increased the external debt from 11 to 198 billion dollars from 1978 to 1980.
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